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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF COLUMBIA 
I'- the Matter of 
DIN: - , 
against 
Petitioner, 
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND COMM:u:NITY SUPERVISION, 
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 
NEW YORK BOARD OF PAROLE, ANDREA W. 
EV ANS, Chairwoman of the New York Board of Parole, 
Respondents, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules. 
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Petitioner, , by and through his undersigned attorneys, 
HO LL YER BRADY LLP, upon information and belief. respectfully alleges as follows: 
1. The Respondents named herein are violating- law and its Constitution 
with impunity by conducting unlawful parole hearings that do not comply with statutory 
amendments that took effect on October 1, 2011. 
2. These new laws mandate that Respondents ( 1) develop and utilize written risk 
assessment procedures ("Procedures") for making parole detenninations and (2) develop a 
transition accountability plan e·TAP'') for each inmate that is to be utilized when making parole 
determinations. 
3. Respondents have admitted that they are statutorily obligated to establish the 
Procedures and to develop a TAP for each inmate, but they have unquestionably failed to do so. 
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4. Instead, they bold repeated parole hearings that violate the laws and infringe on 
inmates• rights. This must stop. 
5. On August 21, 2012, Respondents conducted a parole hearing (the "August 
Hearing") for Petitioner without the statutorily-required Procedures and 
TAP. The next day, Mr.- received Respondents' denial of his parole application (the 
"August Decision''). The August Hearing was unlawful. and the August Pecision should be 
vacated 
6. Mr. - respectfully submits this Verified Petition requesting that the Court 
enter judgment pursuant to CPLR § 7806: (1) determining that the August Hearing was unlawful; 
(2) vacating the August Decision; (3) ordering the Board to release Mr. - or hold a de novo 
hearing in accordance with the law; (4) ordering the Respondents to establish written Procedures 
in accordance with Executive Law§ 259-c(4); (5) ordering Respondents to develop a TAP for 
Mr- ; and (6) granting such other and further relief as this Court deer~.s appropriate. 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION & VENUE 
7. Petitioner , is an imnate currently 
incarcerated at 
11111- Mr. - earned a presumptive right of release when he completed his minimum 
sentence of incarceration on June 18, 2012. He had no prior criminal record and has no 
disciplinary infractions in the two years he bas been incarcerated. · 
8. Upon information and belief, Respondent New York State Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision (''DOCCS·') is an administrative agency of New York 
''•State that is in charge of incarcerated persons, with an office located at Building 2, 1220 
Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12226-2050. DOCCS was created in 2011 pursuant to 
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a statutory merger of the New York Department of Correctional Services and the New York 
Division of Parole. 
9. Upon information and belief, Respondent Brian Fischer is the Commissioner of 
DOCCS, with an office located at Building 2, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 
12226-2050. Commissioner Fischer's responsibilities include ensuring that DOCCS complies 
with statutory requirements, including promulgating the written risk assessment Procedures 
required by statute. 
10. Upon information and belief, the New York State Board of Parole ("Board") is an 
administrative agency housed within DOCCS that maintains some independent decision-making 
authority regarding, among other things, parole release. The Board's principal office is located 
at Building 2, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, New York 12226-2050. 
11. Upon information and belief Respondent Andrea Evans is· the Chairwoman of the 
Board, with an office located at Building 2, 1220 Washington A venue, Albany, New York 
12226-2050. Respondent Evans's responsibilities include ensuring that the Board complies with 
statutory directives, including conducting lawful hearings, developing TAP, and making lawful 
determinations with respect to parole. 
12. This Petition challenges (a) Respondents' violation of New York Statutes that 
direct the promulgation and utilization of written Procedures that incorporate a risk and needs 
assessment for an inmate, including those with Certificates of Earned Eligibility, such as Mr. 
- , (b) Respondents' failure to develop a TAP for Mr.- , and (c). Respondents' August 
Decision to deny Mr. - parole application. 
13. Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Section 7803(3) of the Civil Practice 
Law and Rules to determine whether Respondents acted lawfully when they failed to establish 
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written risk assessment Procedures with respect to an inmate with a Certificate of Earned 
Eligibility, failed to develop a Transitional Accountability Plan for Mr. - and failed to 
grant his parole application. 
14. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to C.P.L.R. 506(b) because Columbia County is 
the County in which Mr. lllllllllwas located when the Respondents' held the August Hearing 
and where Mr. - received Respondents' decision denying parole. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
The Investigation and Plea Agreement 
15. In 2007, Mr. - learned that he was a person of interest in then-Attorney 
General Andrew Cuomo's investigation regarding New York State's Common Retirement Fund. 
The investigation was lengthy and high profile, and has been widely reported in the press from 
) 
2007 to this day. 
16. Mr._ was indicted in 2009. By that time, he had been under investigation 
for two years. He bad no prior criminal record, committed no crime during the time he was 
inve~gated, and continued to live in New York State for nearly two years after his indictment 
without restriction or incident. 
17. In November 2010, Mr. - pleaded guilty to a single E-Felony in violation of 
Section 352(cX6) of the New York General Business Law, the Martin Act, which related to his 
work as a licensed, registered placement agent The case involved novel claims of criminal 
liability under the Martin Act 
18. This was Mr. - first offens~. He was 57 years old. 
19. As part of his plea agreement, Mr- agreed to life-long penalties that make 
it impossible for him to even attempt to re-commit the crime to which he pleaded guilty or any 
other securities-related crime. Thus: Mr. - lost his securities licenses (both state and 
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federal), was banned from participating in the securities industry, was banned from acting as a 
placement agent, was banned from soliciting or receiving public pension fund investments, and 
was banned from seeking employment and doing business with the State of New York. Mr. 
- also became subject to automatic disbarment as an attorney by virtue of his felony 
conviction. (Exh. A).1 
20. Due to these extensive banishments, it is literally impossible for Mr. - to 
commit any securities-related crime again. 
21. Mr. - also agreed to forfeit $19 million (and has done so), which represented 
all of the fees the Attorney General asserted Mr. - had earned as a placement agent 
Sentencing 
22. On February 14, 2011, the New York City Department of Probation prepared a 
Pre-Sentence Investigation report. This report recommended probation, a fine, and community 
service with no jail time (Exh. B). 
23. Mr. llllllllt was sentenced on February 17, 2011. At the sentencing, the Attorney 
General confirmed that Mr- had already paid the State Pension Fund almost $18 million 
with the remainder forthcoming.2 The Attorney General recommended imposition of a sentence 
of incarceration, but made no recommendation with respect to the length of incarceration. (Exb. 
D at 6-7). 
24. Mr. - was given an opportunity to speak prior to sentencing. He expressed 
his deepest remorse and acknowledged that bis actions undermined the integrity of New York 
State's government (Exh. D at 15). 
Exhibits are anne:ited to the accompanying Affirmation of Orlee Goldfeld, executed on the 5m day of March 
2013, and are referred to herein as "Exh. _ ." 
2 On Jwie 15, 2011, Justice Stone entered an Order confuming that Mr. - had made full restitution in 
the amount of$19 million (Exh. C). 
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25. New York County Supreme Court Justice Lewis Bart Stone sentenced Mr. -
to an indeterminate sentence pursuant to statute of one-and-one-third to four years. Justice Stone 
found that "it is not likely tbatlllllllllwill 'do it again' in the future." 
26. Mr. - was immediately taken into custody and has been incarcerated since 
that date. 
Model Behavior in Prison 
27. During his prison term, Mr- has bad no disciplinary infractions. On 
January 12, 2012, Respondents Fischer and DOCCS granted Mr.- a Certificate of Earned 
Eligibility, which created a presumptive right of release when he completed his minimum 
sentence on June 18, 2012 ("Minimum Sentence Date''), barring a constitutional and lawful 
finding by the Board that he was likely to reoffend when at liberty and that his release is not 
compatible with the general welfare of society. (Exh. E). 
28. On February 2, 2012, a parole officer interviewed Mr. - and administered 
the COMP AS ReEntry Risk Assessment e'COMP AS") in preparation for Mr. - s first 
parole hearing in February 2012. The COMP AS measures an inmate's risk to commit a violent 
felony, risk to abscond, and risk to be arrested. Mr. - scored the lowest possible risk on all 
three of the COMP AS metrics. He also scored the lowest possible overall risk on the 
COMPAS. Thus, the Board's own empirical data showed that Mr.- is highly unlikely to 
reoffcnd if released, and no more likely to reo:ffend than any other inmate that applies for parole. 
(Exh. F). 
29. The Board als~ prepared an Inmate Status Report, which upon information and 
belief, was based upon the Board's own data and the parole officer's interview with Mr.- · 
The Inmate Status Report shows that the Guideline Range of incarceration for Mr.- was 
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12-18 months, that he had been granted a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, that he had not 
incurred any disciplinary infractions to date, that he had a parole release plan that included 
housing and employment, and that his plan was to return to his work, spend time with his elderly 
mother, and possibly volunteer or obtain employment with a not-for-profit agency (Exh. G). 
30. Respondents never prepared a Transitional Accountability Plan ('7 AP"), which is 
an instrument that, among other things, is required pursuant to Corrections Law § 71-a to provide 
vital information about an inmate's risks and needs for use at parole hearings (Exh. H). 
31. The Board denied Mr. - parole application in February 2012. 
Prior Article 78 Proceedings 
32. After perfecting his administrative appeal of the February 2012 parole denial, on 
May 30, 2012, Mr- commenced a special proceeding pursuant to Article 78 in the 
Supreme Court, Albany County, Index No. 3117-2012, with respect to his February 2012 
hearing. That Article 78 Petition sought, inter alia, judicial review of the Respondents' unlawful 
conduct in failing to establish the Procedures and a TAP for Mr. - ("Prior Proceeding") 
~ .~39). 
33. On July 5, 2012, after requesting an extension of time to respond to the Mr. 
- arguments and to assemble the administrative record, Respondents moved to dismiss 
the Prior Proceeding for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the claims were 
unripe. Respondents attached a copy of Mr. - parole packet., but did not address any of 
the substantive grounds of the Petition. (Exh. I). Mr. - opposed the Motion. 
34. On August 8, 2012, the Court (Cahill, J.) dismissed the Prior Proceeding for 
failme to exhaust administrative remedies. 
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35. Prior to that determination, upon the expiration of the four-month administrative 
appeal period, on July 30, 2012, Mr. - commenced a second Article 78 proceeding, Index 
No. 4360-12 (Albany County), on the same grounds as the first Article 78, challenging the 
Respondents' failure to establish written Procedures, failure to develop a TAP, and irrational, 
and arbitrary and capricious decision to deny his parole application. 3 
36. When their answer was due, Respondents finally conceded that the February 2012 
parole hearing was unlawful for failure to obt.ain a letter from Mr. - defense counsel 
regarding his thoughts on Mr. - parole application. Respondents offered a de novo 
heatjng and requested that the Court dismiss the second Article 78 Petition without ruling on its 
merits. 
August Parole Hearing 
37. 9n August 14, 2012, Mr. - appeared for his de nova hearing. Inexplicably, 
the Commissioners failed to bring with them Mr. - parole packet, and claimed that the 
Board no longer had it because it had been renuned to Mr. llllllilafler his February 2012 
bearing.4 Mr. - arranged for duplicate copies of his parole packet to be provided to the 
Board. 
38. With the parole packet in hand, on August 21, 2012, the Board conducted the de 
novo August Hearing that lasted approximately 30 minutes. (A copy of.the redacted transcript is 
annexed as Exh. L.) 
3 Th.e Board finally dismissed Mr. - administrative appeal for academic reasons on February 28, 
2013, nearly l year after that the appeal wasperl'ected (Exh. S). 
4 Of course, Respondents attached a copy of Mr. - parole packet to their motion to dismiss Mr. 
- first Article 78 proceeding. (Exh. I.) 
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39. Once again, the Board did not have the written Procedures, and there was no TAP 
developed for Mr.- · 
40. Upon information and belief, prior to the Parole Hearing the Commissioners spent 
mere minutes reviewing Mr. - s parole application packet. (Exh. Kat 57-59). 
41. No evidence adduced during the August Hearing showed any possibility that Mr. 
- was a reasonable probability to reoffend if at liberty or that his release is not compatible 
with the welfare of society. 
42. Rather, during the Hearing, the uncontroverted evidence showed that: 
• Mr. - defense counsel strongly supported Mr.~ parole 
application (Exh. Lat 3) 
• This was Mr. - only conviction (Exh. Lat 4). 
• Mr- bas a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, which as a 
Commissioner stated, "is an important piece of paper. There is a 
presumption in [Mr. - favor as it relates to release and it indicates 
to us that you've been a good prisoner." (Exh. L at 4; Exh. E). 
• Mr. - was "commended" for having "no Tier II or Tier Ills during 
his sentence." (Exh. Lat 4-5). 
• Mr.- · who is in protective custody and thus segregated from the 
general prison population, has tried to help the inmates around him with 
their education. (Exh. L at 5). 
• Mr. - has support in the community, including a group of 30 people 
that signed a pledge to spend one day each month to help him reintegrate 
into society. (Exh. Lat 6, 15; Exh. J). 
• Even though Mr- has a home to retwn to and has friends and 
family ready and willing to take him ~ he agreed to live wherever the 
Board thought was appropriate. (Exh. L at 6-7). 
• Mr- repeatedly expressed his remorse and stated that he would 
spend the rest of his life trying to make up for what he had done (Exh. L at 
13-14, 28-29). 
9 
FUSL000031 
• Mr. - has an "overall risk in criminal involvements is rated as being 
low nsk." (Exh. L at 15). 
• Mr.llllmade full monetary restitution of the $19 million that the 
prosecutor said that he earned as a placement agent (Exh. L at 16, 27). 
• Mr- has an education (Exh. L at 18). 
• Mr. - bas s.everal job opportunities available to him upon his release 
and the financial wherewithal to support himself for the rest of his life. 
(Exh. L at 19). 
43. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence in support of release, including the 
Certificate of Earned Eligibility (Exh. E), COMP AS (Exh. F), and the Inmate Status Report that 
noted the 12-18 month guideline range (Exh. G), and no opposition to his release, upon 
information and belief, the Board immediately denied Mr. - request for parole. The 
August Decision read as follows: 
5 
Denied 9 months. Next appearance, November 2012. 5 
Parole denied. 
After a personal interview, record review, and deliberation, this panel 
finds your release is incompatible with the public safety and welfare. 
Required statutory factors have been considered, including your risk 
to the conummity, rehabilitation effortS, and your needs for successful 
community reintegration. 
Your instant offense involved a guilty plea to General Business Law 
Section 352-C(6), wherein you engaged in a systematic series of 
fraudulent stock market-related transactions. Your course of conduct 
over a period of multiple years show [SIC] a disregard for your 
ethical responsibilities as a licensed security broker and attorney. 
Consideration has been given to your receipt of an Earned Eligibility 
Certificate, good behavior, program accomplishments (as able), and 
document submissions. 
Due to your actions over a period of time and deceitful nature of 
those activities which placed the integrity of the New York State 
The nine month period was calculated from F cbroary 2012. 
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Common Retirement Fund at risk, your release at this time is denied. 
There is a reasonable probability you would not live and remain at 
liberty without violating the law. 
Exh. Lat 31-32. 
44. Mr. - was told to reappear in November 2012 
November 2012 
45. On November 7, 2012, Mr. - appeared for his next parole hearing. Causing 
yet additional delay, two of the Commis~ioners recused themselves, the hearing was cancelled, 
an.d Mr. - was told to come back in December 2012 or earlier. 
46. The next day, on November 8, 2012, the Board sent a copy of the August Hearing 
transcript to Mr. - counsel, stating that even though his administrative appeal of the 
August hearing bad been perfected, Mr. - would have an opportunity to provide 
supplemental briefing based on the transcript on or before December 24, 2012. (Exh. M). 
4 7. On November 14, 2012, the Board conducted a parole hearing and once again 
denied parole. That decision is not the subject of the instant Article 78 Petition and is currently 
being administratively appealed. 
48. On December 21, 2012, in response to an inquiry from Mr.- counsel, with 
respect to the administrative appeal of the August Decision, Counsel to Respondent Board stated: 
By reason of Mr. - reappearance before the Board of Parole on 
November 14, 2012, the appeal referenced below, #08-330-12, taken from 
his August 21, 2012 de novo initial interview~ is now moot. Maner of 
Ortiz v. Alexander. 83 A.D.3d 1078; Matter of Borcsok v. New York State 
Board of Parole, 76 A.D.3d 1167; Matter of Brown v. New York State 
Board of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 137; Matter of LaSalle v. New York State 
Division of Parole, 52 A.D.3d 1071; Matter of McAllister v. New York 
State Division of Parole, 28 A.D.3d 1046, Iv. denied, 7 N. Y.3d 715; Matter 
of Graziano v. Travis, 21 A.D.3d 1174. 
Accordingly, there is no need to submit any further documentation in 
connection with administrative appeal #08-330-12. At this time, the only 
11 
(Exh. N). 
FUSL000031 
administrative appeal that is pending is the appeal taken from Mr. -
November 14, 2012 reappearance and related decision, administrative 
appeal #11-270-12. 
49. It is clear, therefore, that by conducting legally defective parole hearings, 
Respondents are attempting to block any judicial review of their actions, leading to the unlawful 
prolonged incarceration of a man who cannot rationally be said to pose any threat to society. 
Administrative Appeal Exhausted 
50. Mr. - administrative appeal was perfected on or about September 12, 
2012. Respondents had until January 12, 2013 to rule on the appeal. They did not Accordingly 
Mr. - may deem his administrative remedy to have been exhausted, and Respondents may 
not raise failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense herein. 9 N.Y.C.RR. § 
8006.4(c). See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. 7801. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Exception to the Mootness Doctrine 
51. Respondents will undoubtedly argue that the instant petition should be denied as 
moot based on Mr. - subsequent November 2012 parole hearing: 
Where, pending a determination of a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to 
review a denial of release to parole, a petitioner receives a subsequent, de 
novo parole hearing; after which the New York State Board of Parole · .. . denies 
release, an appeal with respect to the prior denial is rendered academic, since the 
petitioner is 'being held pursuant to the subsequent determination.' 
Matter of Ortiz v. Alexander, 83 A.D.3d 1078, 921 N.Y.S.2d 863 (2d Dep't 2011) (citing Matter 
of Flanders v. New York State Div. of Parole, 14 A.D.3d 703 (2d Dep't 2005)). 
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52. An.exception to the mootness doctrine may apply, however, where the issue to be 
decided, though moot, (1) is likely to recur, either between the parties or other members of the 
public; (2) is substantial and novel and (3) will typically evade review in the courts. See Matter 
of Hearst Corp. v C/yne1 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714-15 (1980). 
53. In Matter of Midgette v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1039, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dep't 2010), the Appellate Division reviewed an earlier parole decision where 
a "substantial issue" will recur in a later parole hearing, and where another "substantial issue" is 
likely to recur but evade review." Id. at 1040 (citing Matter of Lebron v. Alexander, 68 A.D.3d 
1476 (3d Dep't 2009); Matter of Mclaurin v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 27 A.D.3d 
565, 566 (2d Dep't 2006); Matter of Standley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 40 A.DJd 
1344, 1345 (3d Dep't 2007)). 
54. Here, the issue of whether a parole hearing is lawful when it does not comply with 
the law will undoubtedly recur (and already has at the November 2012 hearing), (2) is substantial 
and novel, because it may be determinative of whether a man is being lawfully incarcerated, and 
(3) will evade judicial review based on the Respondents' ability to schedule repeatedly unlawful 
parole heari?gs, thereby wtilaterally quashing any judicial oversight. 
55. Unless this Court intercedes, Mr. - will once again appear at a parole 
hearing that will be just as unlawful as the earlier ones for the precise reasons detailed herein. 
Accordingly, Mr .. - respectfully requests that this Court rule upon the substance of bis 
arguments, rather than simply dismiss the Petition as moot. 
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Point II 
Respondents' Conduct Was Unlawful and Unconstitutional 
56. This Petition challenges whether the Board's conduct was lawful at the August 
Hearing, when it acted in blatant violation of Executive Law§ 259-c(4) that requires that the 
Board to: 
establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by 
law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the boar~ the likelihood of 
.. success of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of 
· parole in detennining which inmates may be released to parole supervision. 
57. The purpose of the statutory revisi~ns to the Executive Law, which was enacted 
on March 31, 2011, was to streamline the parole process and require the Board to make 
evidence-based detenninations for each inmate applying for parole. The focus of parole 
determinations was to shift away from the instant crime, i.e. unchangeable past events, to an 
inmate's current and future risks and needs, which are changeable. 
58. The effective date of this mandate imposed on the Board was October 1, 2011. 
Mr. - appeared before the Board on August 21, 2012. More than ten months bad passed 
since the time when the Board was required to establish the written Procedures for its use in 
making parole decisions that incorporated risk and needs principles to assist in making release 
decisions. Despite the requirement imposed on the Board by the Legislature in Executive Law § 
259-c( 4), the Board failed to enact the written Procedures for its use in detennining whether Mr. 
- may be released at the time of the August Hearing. 
59. In fact, a year and a half had passed since the passage of the amendment that 
provided the Board with notice that the Legislature required it to establish written Procedures for 
use in maldng parole decisions. Presumably eighteen months would be sufficient time to 
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establish the mandated Procedures. Apparently it was not. It is exactly that failure by the Board 
to enact the required Procedures that makes the August Decision unlawful. 
60. Without written procedures, administrative agencies would have unfettered 
discretion to render unlawful decisions. That is why the Legislature required written procedures 
to guide the. process. The Legislature recognized the danger inherent when an agency exercises 
.discretion in the absence of written procedures. Such unfettered discretion is on its face arbitrary 
and capricious. "The safeguard against arbitrary administrative action lies in the promulgation of 
adequate standards .... " Nicholas v. Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 33 (1979). Moreover, .. it is 
fundamental that employees of any State agency must administer the law in accordance with the 
will of the Legislature.''. Id at 30. When an agency fails to establish procedures or guidelines, 
the resulting decision is arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law. See id at 28. 
61. "[An] administrative agency is forbidden from exercising its discretionary 
power without first detailirig standards or guides to govern the exercise of that discretion." 
Id. at 34. Not only is a decision made without first enacting Procedures arbitrary and 
capricious, it is also contrary to law. In this case, the Board has simply chosen to ignore 
the law, i.e. Executive Law § 259-c(4), and make parole decisions without any written 
Procedures. 
Point ID 
Respondents' Own Statements Prove That No Written Procedures Have Ever Been 
Established and That The Law Is Being Ignored 
62. On October 5, 2011, Respondent Evans issued a memorandum ("Evans 
Memorandum") in which she stated that the law had been amended and that the Board and 
DOCCS have been working on developing the TAP: 
15 
FUSL000031 
[M]embers of the Board have been working with staff of [DOCCS] in the development of 
a trwisition accountability plan (".TAP"). This instrument which incorporates risk and 
needs principles, will provide a meaningful measurement of an inmate's rehabilitation. 
With respect to the practices of the Board, the TAP instrument will replace the inmate 
status report that you have utilized in the past when assessing the appropriateness of an 
inmate's release to parole supervision. 
(Exh. 0). 
63. The Evans Memorandum., written after the effective date of the amendment, 
further states that if a TAP is not developed, then the commissioners conducting a parole hearing 
should continue to refer to the Inmate Status Report. 
64. The Evans Memorandum does not state that it is the written Procedures ~equired 
by Executive Law§ 259-:c(4), and Respondent Evans admitted one month later that her 
Memorandum is not the written Procedures at a hearing before the New York State 
Assembly's Standing Committee on Correction ("Committee Hearing"): 
As for the Board's development of written procedures to be used when making release 
decisions, in July of 2011 each member of the Board received training in the use of the 
TAP instrument. And in September of 2011 all of the members received training in the 
use 9f the risk and needs instrument known to all of us as COMP AS. Currently, the use 
of these instruments is being piloted in three of the department's correctional facilities for 
the purpose of establishing appropriate conditions of supervision. 
When the pilot phase for these instruments is concluded, the Board looks forward to their 
use when assessing the appropriateness of an inmate's release to community supervision. 
Because the TAP. instrument indicates an inmate's overall effort toward effecting his or 
her rehabilitation while incarcerated and draws upon information closely associated with 
their risk of reoffending and in needs in order to become successful, the Board's written 
procedures will call for the use and careful consideration of these documents. 
As an interim measure, I instructed the Board to use the TAP instrument when and where 
it has been prepared for the parole-eligible inmate. Moreover, the Board has been 
reminded of the standard for assessing the appropriateness ofan inmate's release to 
parole as well as the statutocy criteria that must be considered. 
And finally, I emphasize that when the Board considers an inmate for parole it must 
ascertain what steps he or she has taken toward rehabilitation and the likelihood of their 
success once released into the community. 
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(emphasis added) (Exh. Kat 19-21). 
65. Notwithstanding Chairwoman Evans' testimony, DOCCS and the Board never 
established written Procedures, and the Evans Memorandum, an admittedly interim measure, 
does not comply with the requirements of Executive Law§ 259-c(4), 9 NYCRR 8000.l(b),6 9 
NYCRR 8000.3,7 and Art. IV, Sec. 8 of the New York State Constitution. 8 
66. In addition, if the Respondents were to assert that the Evans Memorandum is the 
written Procedures, then the Respondents would have violated Article 2 of the State 
Administrative Procedure Act, which governs the Procedures for rulemaking by Respondents 
DOCCS and Board of Parole (N.Y. SAP Law§§ 102(1), 201-207). 
67. Even more perplexing is that Respondent Evans, while acknowledging the 
statutory amendment requiring her agency's establishment of written Procedures to incorporate 
risk assessment, directed agency staff in an her Memorandum, that, nonvithstanding the 
amendment, "[p]lease know that the standard for assessing the appropriateness for release, as 
well as the statutory criteria you must consider bas not changed .... " (Exh. 0.) The Board's 
failure to establish the required written Procedures is compounded by Respondent Evans' 
6 9 NYCRR 8000.l{b)(l) provides: 
(b) Regulations of the Board of Parole shall be enacted by the Board of Parole and shall govern the 
conduct of the Board of Parole and its responsibility to: 
(1) determine what inmates serving indeterminate or reformatory sentences of imprisonment 
may be released on parole, and when and under what conditions 
9 NYCRR 8000.3 provides: 
The chairman in his discretion, or the board in its discretion, may direct orally or in writing that any rule or 
regulation may be stayed, suspended, rescinded, modified or amended. If the direction is oral, it shall be reduced to 
writing as soon as practicable, and if the direction constitutes an amendment, it shall be filed with the Secretary of 
State. 
a New York State Constitution, Article IV, Section 8 provides, in part: 
§ 8. No rule or regulation made by any state department, board, bureau, officer, authority or commission, 
except such as relates to the organiz.ation or internal management of a state department, board, bureau, authority or 
commission shall be effective until it .is filed in the office of the department of state .... 
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disavowal of the statute's import. What, then, was the purpose of the amendment? To keep 
things status quo ante? 
68. Such disregard of a Legislative mandate by aii administrative agency is 
arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. 
69. The lack of Procedures is particularly troublesome here in light of the fact that 
the Board had available for its use the COMPAS Re·Entry Risk Assessment (Exh. F), which 
determined that Mr. - was extremely low risk, yet without written Procedures, the Board 
made a decision outside the requirements of Executive Law § 259-c( 4) and irrationally ignored 
its own risk and needs assessment instrument. 
70. Thus, there are no written Procedures, and the August 21, 2012 parole hearing 
was unlawful, as the Court found in Matter of Cotto v. Evans, No. 139796, 2013 NY Slip Op 
30222[U] (St Lawrence Cty. Jan. 22, 2013) (Exh. P): 
[T]bis Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that the written procedures mandated 
by the amended version of Executive Law §259-c( 4) were established, much less 
implemented and considered in the context of detennining whether or not petitioner 
should be released to parole supervision. Accordingly, the Court finds that the December 
2011 parole denial determination was not rendered in accordance with law and must be 
overturned, with the matter remitted to the Board of Parole for de novo discretionary 
parole release consideration. See Thwaites v. New York State Board of Parole, 34 Misc 
3d 694. See also Lichtel v. Travis, 287 AD2d 83. 
Point IV 
The Board Ignored Relevant Evidence 
71. The evidence to be considered by the Board includes a TAP, a Certificate of 
Earned Eligibility, COMPAS, and the.evidence adduced at a parole hearing. 
Transitional Accountability Plan 
72. In order to make lawful parole de~rminations, Respondents DOCCS and the 
. . 
Board, under the leadership of Respondents Fischer and Evans, were required to develop for 
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each inmate a Transitional Accountability Plan ("'TAP") in accordance with Correction Law § 
71-a, which also became effective on October 1, 20!'1. 
73. The 2011 Annual Report of the New York Assembly's Committee on Corrections 
described the TAP as: 
... a comprehensive, dynamic and individualized case management plan 
based on the programming and treatment needs of the inmate. The purpose 
of the TAP is to promote successful rehabilitation and provide DOCCS 
with the necessary information to prioritize programming and treatment 
services based on the individual needs of each inmate. The TAP will also 
be provided to the Parole Board to assist them in making discretionary 
parole release decisions. 
74. According to DOCCS's April 2011 Fact Sheet: "By statute, DOCCS is required 
to implement an offender Transition Accountability plan that includes an integrated team 
case management plan based on a research based risk assessment tool." (emphasis added) (Exh. 
Q). 
75. When asked about implementation of the TAP at the Committee Hearing in 
November 2011, Respondent Fischer testified that TAP will "go live by July 1 [2012] and that 
''three months [thereafter] everyone will be on it." (emphasis added) (Exh. Kat 4748). 
Respondent Fischer made no statement that only new inmates will have a TAP. 
76. Respondent Evans also testified about the TAP at the Committee Hearing. 
According to her, the legislatively-mandated TAP "will be the instrument that will measure the 
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the Board as well as their likelihood of success in the 
community when released." (Exh. K at 19). She further stated: 
Because the TAP instrument indicates an inmate's overall effort toward 
effecting his or her rehabilitation while incarcerated and draws upon 
information closely associated with their risk of reoffending and in needs 
in order to become successful, the Board's written procedures will call for 
the use and careful consideration of these documents. 
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(Exh. K at 20). 
77. Respondents admit that they did not develop a TAP for Mr- (Exh. H). 
Therefore, Respondents undeniably acted unlawfully by violating CorrectiOJ?S Law §71-a and in 
contradiction of the testimony given at the Committee Hearing by Respondents Fischer and 
Evans. 
78. By making a parole decision without the use of a TAP, the Board acted contrary 
to the statutorily mandated lawful procedures, went beyond its prescribed statutory powers, and 
denied Mr. - the right to have a decision made based upon risk and needs principles, in 
violation oflawful procedures and due process oflaw as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and Article L Section 6 of the New York State Constitution. 
Certificate of Earned Eligibility 
79. Certificates of Earned Eligibility are granted in accordance with§ 805 of the 
Corrections Law by DOCCS, which is most familiar with an i.iunate' s conduct on a daily and 
aggregate basis. They are selectively granted by Commissioner Fischer in an exercise of his 
discretion and only after an inmate satisfies the requirements thereof. 
80. In other words, a Certificate of Earned Eligibility is DOCCS's own "stamp of 
approval" for the Board's release of an inmate at the time he completes his minimum sentence. 
81. Mr. - earned a presumptive right to be paroled because DOCCS gave him a 
Certificate of Earned Eligibility. N.Y. Corrections Law§ 805 provides, in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an inmate who is serving a sentence with a 
minimum term of not more than eight years and who has been issued a certificate of , 
earned eligibility, shall be granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term 
or as authorized by subdivision four of section eight h1U1dred sixty-seven of this chapter 
unless the board of parole determines that there· is a reasonable probability that, if such 
inmate is released, he will not live and i:emain at liberty without violating the law and that 
his release is not compatible with the welfare of society. 
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82. Thus, section 80 5 "creates a presumption in favor of parole release of any inmate 
who ... has received a certificate of earned eligibility and has completed a minimum term of 
imprisonment of eight years or less." Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304, 307 (1st Dep't 2005); 
see also Schwartz v. Dennison, 14 Misc.3d 121 l(A). 836 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Table) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cty. 2006). 
83. Likewise, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(c) provides that for inmates with a Certificate of 
Earned Eligibility ''parole release shaJl be granted at the expiration of [the] minimum term of 
imprisonment as long as such release is in accordance with the remaining guideline criteria." 
Those criteria include the guideline time-range matrix, the institutional disciplinary record, 
performance during any temporary release programs, release plans, and any available 
information that would indicate an inability to live at liberty without violating the law, and that 
release is incompatible with the welfare of society. Id. (emphasis added). 
84. To date, DOCCS has no written Procedures in place as to a risk and needs 
assessment for any inmate, including those with a Certificate of Earned Eligibility. This amounts 
to a per se violation of Executive Law § 259-c( 4). 
85. By all measures, Mr. - should have been granted parole. Review of the 
guideline criteria shows that in Mr. - case: 
GUIDELINE CRITERIA 
Guideline time-ran e matrix: 12-18 months 
Performance during any temporary release 
ro ams 
Release plans 
Information indicating an inability to live at 
libe without violatin the law 
Infonnation that release is incompatible with 
welfare of society. 
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More than 24 months thus far. 
NI A. No temporary release granted although 
a lied for. 
A home, employment, family support, 
community support, and financial self-
suffi.cienc 
None 
None, including no opposition to parole 
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CUMPAS 
86. Toe lack of Procedures is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that the 
Board had available for its use the COMP AS, which determined that Mr. - was extremely 
low risk (actually the lowest possible risk on the scale) (Exh. E). Yet; without Procedures 
complying with due process, the Board made a decision outside the requirements of Executive 
Law§ 259-c{4) and irrationally ignored its own risk and needs assessment instrument. The 
development and implementation of this instrument was also mandated by the recent amendment 
to Correction Law§ 112(4). 
87. With a risk and needs assessment instrument before them that Respondents were 
required to develop and implement, and without any of the lawfully required written Procedures 
as to how to use such instrument in order to make their release decision. the Board acted in 
violation of lawful procedures and due process of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of'the New York State Constitution. 
Due Process 
88. Moreover, the Board, under Respondent Evans• direction. conducted the unlawful 
August Hearing that deprived Mr. - of due process. Due process requires that the Board 
provide an inmate with an opportunity to be heard and a substan?ve explanation of the reasons 
for denial of parole. See Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 573. Due process also 
requires that the August Hearing be conducted pursuant to the New York Statutory edicts that the 
Board follow written risk assessment Procedures and develop a TAP of each inmate. 
89. Accordingly, the Parole Hearing was unlawful and unconstitutional on its face. 
90. Due process also requires that the reasons for denial cannot be concluso'ry, 
arbitraxy, impermissible, or a mere regurgitation of the statutory language. Id. at 574. 
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91. Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(a) provides in relevant part: 
If parole is not granted upon such review, the inmate shall be informed in 
writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors and reasons 
for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in 
conclusory terms. (Emphasis added). 
The rules and regulations governing parole include similar provisions: 
Decisions outside the guidelines. The time ranges indicated above are merely 
guidelines. Mitigating or aggravating factors may result in decisions above or 
below the guidelines. In any case where the decision rendered is outside the 
guidelines, the detailed reason for such decisions, including the fact or factors 
relied on, shall be provided to the inmate in writing. 
9 NYCRR §8001.3(c) (emphasis added). 
92. The August Decision failed to provide the requisite detail and/or non-conclusory 
terms the statute and regulations demand, and no aggravating factors were identified. The 
Board's determination was made in violation of the due process clauses of the 14th Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution ~d Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution. 
93. The Board also denied Mr. - the opportunity to be heard. Executive Law§ 
259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider certain factors enumerated in the statute (i) through 
(vii). The factors to be considered include the Mr. - institutional disciplinary record, 
involvement in institutional programs, and plans upon release, in addition to the circumstances 
surrounding the criminal offense for which he currently is incarcerated. 
94. The Board did not inquire into Mr. - positive interactions with prison staff 
during his incarceration, including his counselors, corrections officers, and various departmental 
supervisors, none of whom ever cited Mr. - with a disciplinary infraction. 
95. Moreover, the statutory language compels a distinction in the review of parole 
denial determinations affecting inmates, such as the Mr.- · who have been issued 
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Certificates of Earned Eligibility. See Oberoi v. Dennison, 19 Misc. 3d l 106(A) (Franklin 
County 2008). 
96. Mr. - receipt of a Certificate of Earned Eiigibility creates a liberty interest 
that entitles him to due process protections in the consideration of his parole application: 
[A]n inmate with a protected liberty interest created by the parole statue 
such as N. Y. Corrections Law §805 is entitled to 'an opportunity to be 
heard, and when parole is denied [the Parole Board] informs the inmate 
in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole. 
Schwartz v. Dennison, 518 F. Supp. 2d 560, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Greenholtz v. 
Inmates ofNebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16, 99 S. Ct 2100 
(1979)) {emphasis added). 
97. The August Decision does not inform Mr- as to how he fell short of 
qualifying for parole. As the Transcript indicates, the August Decision was based solely upon 
the instant crime and made no mention of what would have been required for him to qualify for 
parole. Exh. L at 31-32. 
PointV 
Respondents' Decision Was Irrational, Bordering on lmpropriety 
98. New York Courts routinely find irrationality where the Board denies parole 
.without evidence or in a conclusory fashion. See, e.g., Coaxum v. New York State Board of 
Parole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006); Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d 1009 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005). 
99. Mr. - e~ed a preswnptive right to be released on his Minimum Sentence 
Date of June 18, 2012, based upon his receipt of a Certificate of Earned Eligibility. Rebuttal of 
th.at preswnption must have been made legally. 
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l 00. Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial 
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law, see Executive Law § 259-
i(S), absent a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See, e.g., Russo v. New York 
State Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Marino v. Travis, 13 
A.D.3d 453, 787 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2dDep't 2004) (holding that denial of inmate's release was 
irrational when not based upon any relevant evidence). 
IO 1. Here, the Board abused its discretion in denying parole. Notbinj! in the 
evidentiary record supports the Board's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that Mr. 
- would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release is not 
compatible with the welfare of society: 
a. The Board's own COMP AS assessment rated Mr. - at the lowest 
possible risk to reoffend, abscond, or be arrested. 
b. DOCCS awarded Mr. - a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, which 
grants a presumptive right of release. 
c. The In.mate Status Report, which was conducted by a parole officer, 
showed that Mr. - has been a model inmate with no disciplinary 
infractions and that the maximum sentence range according to 
regulatory guidelines for his first time offense of an E felony was 12-18 
months, 9 NYCRR § 8001.3. 
d. The sentencing judge was of the opinion that Mr. - ''wouldn't do it 
again." In addition, the sentencing judge did not oppose parole. 
e. The Probation Department recommended no jail time. 
f. The Office of the Attorney General did not recommend any length of 
incarceration. 
g. The Office of the Attorney General did not oppose parole. 
h. Mr. - is a first-time offender of a non-violent crime. 
i. Mr. - made full monetary restitution of $19 million - the total 
amount sought by the Office of the Attorney General. 
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j. Mr. - parole plan included employment, a residence, family and 
community support. and rmancial self-sufficiency. 
l 02. Facially and substantively, there was nothing more that Mr. - could have 
done as an inmate or provided to the Board in his submissions in order to qualify for parole. 
103. If someone with Mr. - outstanding record cannot receive· parole, can 
anybody? 
104., The statutory guidelines require consideration of the factors enumerated in 
Executive Law § 259-i(a)(2)(C). After considering all the factors relevant to the individual 
inmate, the Board then may accord greater or lesser weight or emphasis to different fact~rs. The 
decision-making is a process of detennining which factors outweigh others: a balancing process. 
Here, however, the Board's decision reveals it accorded no weight and no emphasis whatsoever 
to any factor apart from Mr. - offense. When left witp the offense as the exclusive factor 
considered and sole basis for the Board's conclusion of nonrehabilitation and unreadiness for 
release, the conclusion is irrational and contrary to the statutory discretion authorized. See 
Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d at 307-08, 794 N.Y.S.2d 381; Coaxum v. New York State Board of 
Parole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006); Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc.3d 1009. 
105. Moreov~r, Executive Law§ 2S9-i(2)(a) requires the Board, upon a denial of 
parole, to issue a written determination of~e factors and reasons for such denial "in detail and 
in non-conclusory terms" (emphasis added). 
I 06. The August Decision includes no meaningful elaboration as to the stated reason 
for denial, only a perfunctory recitation of the factors purportedly considered. Paying lip service 
to the statutory factors without providing any substance is insufficient. See, e.g., In re Winchell, 
32 Misc. 3d I217(A), at •5 (Sullivan County 2011) ("The Board cannot deny parole merely 
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repeating. the statutory criteria."); Weinstein v. Dennison ("[T]he Board is required to do more 
than merely mouth the statutory criteria, particularly where as here each factor recited and 
brought forth in the parole interview, other than the crime itself, militated in favor of release"). 
107. Thus, where, as here, the Board focuses entirely or even "almost entirely on the 
nature of petitioner's crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone 
conclusion and does not comport with the statutory scheme." King v. New York State Division of 
Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431-32, 598 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1st Dep't 1993); see also Kozlowski v. New 
York State Board of Parole, 2013 NY Slip Op 30265[U] (Sup. Ct. Feb. 05, 2013) (Exh. R). 
108. In the absence of judicial intervention now, Mr. - is in a Kafkaesque 
constitutional Catch-22 - stuck in an administrative proceeding designed to keep him 
incarcerated without a way out. The Board conducted a facially and substantively unlawful 
Parole Hearing in violation of Mr. - due process rights and the laws of New York. As a 
result, he remains incarcerated past his Minimum Sentence Date, and longer than the Certificate 
of Earned Eligibility, COl'vfPAS, and the evidence adduced at the August Hearing would require. 
Point VI 
Unlawful Re-Sentencing 
109. The New York State sentencing and parole scheme is well-established. The 
Legislature and the Governor set the sentencing law and ranges, and Justices implement the 
sentencing ranges. The Legislature and Governor set the parole standards, including Corrections 
Law§ 805 Certificate of Earned Eligibility and the benefits that run with it, and the Board's job 
is to implement those standards - not to undermine them or usurp them. 
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110. While the Board has wide discretion within the statutory framework for parole 
decisions, the Board does not have the authority to resentence. The 8oard's role is to evaluate an 
inmate's current danger, not to resentence him for a past crime. See, e.g., Winchell v. Evans, 
32 Misc. 3d 1217(A), at •2 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cty. July 19, 2011) ("Parole may not be denied 
solely based on the offense itself.... Re-sentencing is not the purview of the Parole Board."); 
Johnson v. NY State Division of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 65 AD.3d 838 ( 4th Dep't 2009); 
Patterson v. Cully, Index No. 1-2011-4748 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cty. Feb. 29, 2011); Wallman v. Travis, 
18 A.D.3d 304, 307-08 (1st Dep't2005); Weinstein v. Dennison, 1 Misc. 3d 1009. 
111. As Respondent Evans stated herself, the mission of the Board is to "ensure 
public safety by granting parole when appropriate under the governing standards." Here, there 
is no evidence that Mr. - poses a threat to public safety. Rather, Respondents are usurping 
the judicial function by resentencing Mr. - to a lengthier period of incarceration. 
112. In reality, by ordering Mr. - n~xt parole hearing in November 2012, the 
Board re-sentenced Mr. - by declaring that he should nearly 2 years for his crime. This re-
sentencing exceeds the statutory sentence in place for a Martin Act violation, the sentence 
imposed by the Justice Stone, and even the regulatory guidelines that provide that Mr. -
should be held for 12-18 months, 9 NYCRR § 8001.3 (Exh. G). 
113. The Board's decision reflects that it (a} determined the minimum sentence that 
Justice Stone imposed to be of no consequence and (b) viewed a one-and-one-third to four year 
sentence to be the same as a two and three-quarters to four years sentence or simply a four year 
sentence. The one-and-one-third sentence imposed, however, reflects the Court's determination 
that under circumstances of reform and rehabilitation, consistent with the statutory scheme, one-
and-one-third is sufficient. Ignoring the sentence that the Court imposed, the Board effectively 
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undertook an unauthorized resentencing, substituting its own opinion of the appropriate sentence 
for that of the Court and the Legislature. See Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304, 307, 311 (l st 
Dep't 2005); Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470,476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000); Weinstein v. 
Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d I 009. 
114. Moreover, the Board bas intentionally turned a blind eye to th.e statutory directive 
that an inmate with a Certificate of Earned Eligibility be granted parole at the conclusion of his 
minimum sentence. 
115. In its August Decision, the Board only discussed Mr. - underlying crime. 
It provided no substantive basis for its finding that Mr. - is a reasonable probability to 
reoffend if at liberty and that bis release is not compatible with the welfare of society. In the 
Matter of Kingv. N.Y.S. Division of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423,432,598 N.Y.S2d 245 (l 5'Dep't 
1993), aff d, 83 N.Y.S. 788 (1994), the Court held that the Board's exclusive reliance on the 
severity of the offense to deny parole not only contravenes the discretionary scheme mandated 
by statute, but also effectively constitutes an unauthorized re-sentencing. That is precisely what 
occuned here. See Kozlowslr:i v. NY Board of Parole (Exh. R). 
CONCLUSION 
116. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the Respondents' actions are 
unconstitutional, unlawful, irrational, arbitrary and capricious. Their acts have led to an 
unconstitutionally prolonged ~arceration of Mr. - since June 18, 2012. 
117. Respondents have failed to discharge their statutory duties to develop written risk 
assessment Procedures regarding an inmate with a Certificate of Earned Eligibility, failed to 
develop a TAP for Mr. - ' failed to conduct a lawful parole hearing, and failed to make a 
rational determination about granting Mr. - parole application. 
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118. Only this Court can stop Respondents' continued illegal and unconstitutional 
actions. Mr. - has already been punished by the laws of New York State for the crime he 
committed, and he has paid the price. Now Mr. - and the criminal justice system need to 
be protected from those who would undermine it. Justice demands no less. 
119. As set forth above, no previous application has been filed for the relief sought 
herein with respect to the August 2012 parole hearing. The two prior Article 78 proceedings 
(Index Nos. 3117-12 and 4360-12) related to the February 2012 parole hearing and were 
dismissed as moot based on Respondents' holding of the August Hearing. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. - respectfully requests that this Court enter Judgment pursuant 
to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules: 
A. Finding that the August Decision denying parole was made unlawfully; 
B. Vacating th!' August Decision; 
C. Directing Respondents to establish written risk assessment Procedures for parole 
determination relating to inmates with a Certificate of Earned Eligibility and to use them with 
respect to Mr. - request for parole; 
D. Directing Respondents to prepare a Transitional Accountability Plan for Mr. 
- E. Directing Respondents to release Mr. - or to hold a de novo hearing before a 
new panel of Commissioners in accordance with the laws and regulations of the State of New 
Yorlc; and 
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F. Granting such other and further relief as is just and proper. 
Dated: New York, New York 
March 5, 2013 
Rule 130-1.1 Certification: 
~=yS~~ 2=,_ __ 
&fJ1 Goldfeld, Esq. 
HOLL YER BRADY LLP 
60 East 42nd Street, Suite 1825 
New York, New York 10165 
Tel: (212) 706-0248 
Fax: (646) 652-5336 
goldfeld@hollyerbrady.com 
Attorne :s or Petitioner 
To the best of my knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under 
the circumstances, the presentation of these papers of the contentions therein are not fiivolous as 
defined in subsection ( c) of section 130-1.1 of the Rules o the Chief Administrator (22NYCRR). 
31 
FUSL000031 
ATTORNEY.VERIFICATION 
Orlee Goldfeld, an attorney duly admitted to practice before the Cowts of the State of 
New York, affirms the following to be true under penalties of perjury: 
I am Of Counsel to the firm of Hollyer Brady LLP, counsel for Petitioner 
- I have read the foregoing Petition and know the contents thereof. and the same are true 
to my knowledge, except those matters therein which are stated to be alleged upon information 
· and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true. My belief, as to those matters 
therein not stated upon knowledge, is based upon facts, records, and other pertinent infonnation 
contained in my files. 
I make the foregoing affirmation pursuant to CPLR 3020(d)(3) because Petitioner is not 
in the County where I have my office. 
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